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Chapter 7 of Sun Tzu's The Art of War for the most part deals with troop movements. So far from Sun Tzu we've learnt that we shouldn't rush into wars without the plan. There must always be a pre-war assessment to compare the strengths of both sides in order to work out the odds of victory. If there are less costly ways for goals to be achieved, such as through a diplomatic settlement, then the battle should be avoided. If fighting is unavoidable, build up an impregnable defense, and use flexible tactics to go after the enemy's weak spots and build a winning momentum, and constantly adjust your tactics to capitalize on your strengths and needle the other side's weaknesses. All this gives us a general guideline to work with. But how to put it all into practice? A battlefield is full of uncertainties, not least because the enemy is trying to be unpredictable. Under these circumstances, how does a commander make sure that their plan can be executed to the fullest extent to get the most desirable outcome? Well, they do it by claiming the initiative. Sun Tzu underlined three points on the context to gain initiative. A well-rested army is more effective than one that's tired. A commander must choose the battleground to his advantage and lead his forces to the right spot before the enemy shows up. This way, their soldiers have time to regroup, recover their strength, and get into position. A typical example of this can be found in the warring state period. The state of Qing wanted to attack the state of Han, so it placed soldiers near its border with the state of Zhao. The king of Zhao sent Zhao Shi to aid the state of Han and resist the Qing forces. Zhao Shi, however, halted his troops scarcely ten miles out of the capital city. The border and Qing forces still a few days much away, Zhao Shi chose to beef up the defense right where they were and stay put for almost a month. A Qing spy came, received hospitable treatment, and returned home to report his findings. Right after the spy left, Zhao Shi ordered his soldiers to take off their heavy armor and head for the border in double much. In just two days, Zhao forces reached the front line, settled down about 15 miles from the Qing camp and occupied a nearby mountain. The Qing forces panicked, surprised by their opponent's speedy arrival and hastened to attack Zhao Shi. But by the time the Qing forces made the 15-mile march, they were exhausted. Combined with the failure to take the high ground, they were defeated by Zhao Shi's well-rested troops who attacked from their high vantage point. In this example, apart from the element of surprise and deception, Zhao Shi claimed the initiative by picking the time and space for the battle. If he had led his troops to the front line straight after leaving the capital, his road-weary soldiers would have been facing a well-rested battle-ready opponent. Sun Tzu believed that the commander must be careful when they are attempting to gain the initiative because it comes with risks as well as benefits. Having spent this time, speed often came at the expense on combat effectiveness, as troops moved mostly on foot. Zhao Shi's soldiers had to sacrifice their heavy armor in exchange for speedy movement. They probably also had to give up a significant portion of their supplies, which raised the risk of failure if the battle became drawn out. The strength of the soldiers is also a part of the equation. If you put me, an office worker carrying a few extra pounds, alongside an Olympic marathon gold medalist in the same march, of course the professional athlete will reach the finishing line before me. For the same reason, only the most robust members of an army are able to join the fight immediately after a lengthy expedition. By Sun Tzu's calculation, a commander could count on two fairs of the troops being able to fight after a 10-mile march. Half may arrive on time across 15 miles, and at the end of a 30-mile hike, only 1 in 10 soldiers would be on time and in position. A commander with his eyes on gaining the initiative must bear in mind the cost of the race to the vantage point, or else he might end up with no soldiers to command at the front, and he'll soon be taken prisoner, or worse, by the frontline enemy forces. Another issue in the context for the initiative is communication. In Sun Tzu's own words, the ideal state of an army is to be as swift as the wind when it moves, as still as a forest when it stays, as fierce as fire when it strikes, and as immovable as a mountain in its defence. This all requires good communication, so that troops can assemble and split up as the situation requires. But even in the early days of the spring and autumn period, when wars were rather limited in scale, a battle often involved thousands if not tens of thousands of soldiers. It was not an easy task to keep everybody on the same page. With battle-thirsty brutes who were allowed to advance at will and faint-hearted aristocrats were free to fall back, it wouldn't be a formation engaging the enemy so much as a vulnerable rapper. As we've previously learned, formation is crucial in a war of chariots. Sun Tzu stressed the use of communication tools. Ancient Chinese commanders relied on bells, drums, torches and flags to relay messages, typically drums signalled advancement and bells withdraw, flags were used in daytime and torches at night. Sun Tzu also wrote about the importance of morale, that critical psychological aspect of war. The modern Chinese still use the idiom 一豆豆 when they encourage people to gather up strength and finish a job in one strike. The story behind the phrase is another famous battle in the spring and autumn period. The state of Qi was attacking the state of Lu. An officer named Cao Gui in the state of Lu discussed the plan for the war with the king. He asked the king of Lu whether he deserved to win this war. The king of Lu said, I always shared food and clothes with my people, Cao Gui said Such small scale of generosity doesn't benefit everyone, that people wouldn't follow you into war just for that. The king of Lu said, when hosting rituals, I'm always honest with the number of sacrificial animals and precious stone. Cao Gui said, such a basic level of honesty is not enough to impress the gods or the people. The king of Lu then said, when dealing with disputes that were brought to my court, I always made sure they were handled fairly to the best of my ability. Cao Gui said, with that you've lived up to your role as the king. Now I believe we may be able to win this war. On the battlefield, as both sides laid out their troops, the Qi army sounded their drums to signal that they were ready to attack. The king of Lu wanted to echo with his drums and commence the fighting, only to be stopped by Cao Gui. Not now, he said. When the army of Qi sounded their drums for the third time, Cao Gui gave the order to ban the drums, ordering the soldiers to advance. In the end, the small state of Lu triumphed over the wealthy state of Qi. The state of Lu had a fighting chance because the king, by adhering to fairness, had the support of his people. He was a king worth fighting for. Another memorable part about the wars in the spring and autumn period is that they were conducted according to propriety, and propriety demanded that fighting must not commence until both sides have sounded their drums to show that they were ready. The key to Cao Gui's victory, however, was that he timed the attack for when the opponent had lost their morale. After the war, Cao Gui told the king of Lu, morale is essential in a war. The first time the Qi army sounded their drums, their morale was at its peak. At the second time, they would have lost some of that steam. And by the third round of drums, they were not sure they wanted to fight. And that's when we sounded our drums and got our soldiers perked up for the battle. And that's how we got the best of them. Sun Zhi's theory on morale was similar to that of Cao Gui. He advised commanders to stay clear of the enemy when they are at their best, and attack only when the opponent is tired and hungry. Sun Zhi also had some other taboos. Don't attack an enemy that's well organized and in perfect formation. Don't fight an uphill battle. Don't intercept an enemy on its way home. And don't surround the enemy without leaving a gap for it to give up and flee. Things like that. Some generals throughout history have probably succeeded by doing the exact opposite of what Sun Zhi advised. But I'm sure there are plenty of war stories in your culture about sudden ships in morale tipping the balance of power and changing the outcome of war. In our next episode, we look at a commander's choices for tackling a few different scenarios.